In this paper we propose and analyze a class of stochastic N -player games that includes finite fuel stochastic games as a special case. We first derive sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a verification theorem, which reveals an essential game component regarding the interaction among players. It is an analytical representation of the conditional optimality condition for NEs, largely missing in the existing literature on stochastic games. The derivation of NEs involves first solving a multi-dimensional free boundary problem and then a Skorokhod problem, where the boundary is "moving" in that it depends on both the changes of the system and the control strategies of other players. Finally, we reformulate NE strategies in the form of controlled rank-dependent stochastic differential equations.
Introduction
N -player non-zero-sum stochastic games are notoriously hard. Recently there has been a surge of interest on Mean Field Games (MFGs), pioneered by [32, 44, 45, 46] . With an ingenious aggregation approach, MFGs nicely reduce the complexity of N -player games by focusing on N → ∞. However, there are undesirable consequences of the MFG aggregation approach and a growing number of studies [14, 43, 27] point to the risk of using MFGs for analyzing N -player games. For instance, Nash equilibria (NEs) of MFGs tend to collapse to that of a single-player game, offering no or limited insight into the general solution structure of N -player games.
Motivated by the need for a more in-depth study of N -player stochastic games, in this work we formulate and analyze a class of stochastic N -player games that originate from the wellknown finite fuel problem. There are many reasons to consider this type of games. Firstly, the finite fuel problem is one of the landmarks in stochastic control theory and a game formulation is natural [4, 5, 39, 37, 40, 22, 6] . Secondly, its simple yet insightful solution structures have had a wide range of applications beyond stochastic control [18, 17, 16, 30, 23, 7, 61, 29, 63, 58, 57, 19, 41, 2, 8] . Thirdly, there is no prior work analyzing its stochastic game counterpart except for the special case of N = 2 and without the fuel constraint [49, 38, 28, 31, 42, 20, 27] . We hope that analyzing this game can shed more light on the fundamental differences between control problems and stochastic games and thus provide useful insights into the intrinsic difficulty of the latter. The stochastic game presented in this paper goes as follows. There are N players whose dynamics X X X t = (X 1 t , · · · , X N t ) is governed by the following N -dimensional diffusion process:
where B B B := (B 1 , . . . , B N ) is a standard N -dimensional Brownian motion in a filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P), with drift b b b := (b 1 , . . . , b N ) and covariance matrix σ σ σ := (σ 1 σ 1 σ 1 , . . . , σ N σ N σ N ) satisfying appropriate regularity conditions. Player i's control, ξ i = (ξ i+ , ξ i− ), is a pair of non-decreasing and càdlàg processes, and of finite variation. Each player has access to some or all of M types of resources. Players interact through their objective functions h i (X 1 t , . . . , X N t ), as well as their shared resources that are the "fuels" of their control. The accessibility of these resources to players and how these resources are consumed by their respective players are governed by a matrix A A A := (a ij ) i,j ∈ R N ×M . The goal of the game is for player i to minimize
over appropriate admissible game strategies, specified in Section 2. When M = 1 and A A A = [1, 1, . . . , 1] T ∈ R N ×1 , this is a pooling game C p C p C p corresponding to the N -player finite fuel game where the N players share a fixed amount of the same resource. When M = N and A A A = I N I N I N , this is an N -player game C d C d C d where each player has her individual fixed amount of resource. In general, this matrix A A A describes the network structure of the N -player game. Note that this N -player game cannot be simply analyzed with an MFG approach as the network structure would collapse if an aggregation approach was applied.
We will analyze the NEs of this stochastic game. We first derive sufficient conditions for the NE policy in the form of a verification theorem (Theorem 3.4), which reveals an essential game element regarding the interaction among players. This is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) representation of the conditional optimality condition for NE in a stochastic game. To understand the structural properties of the NEs, we proceed further to analyze this stochastic game in terms of the game values, the NE points, and the controlled dynamics. Mathematically, the analysis involves first solving a multi-dimensional free boundary problem and then a Skorokhod problem with a moving boundary. The boundary is "moving" in that it moves in response to both the changes of the system and the control strategies of other players. The analytical solution is derived by first exploring the two special games C p C p C p and C d C d C d . Analyzing these two types of games provides key insights into the solution structure of the general game. Finally, we reformulate the NE strategies in the form of controlled rank-dependent stochastic differential equations (SDEs), and compare game values with games C p C p C p and
Main contributions. (i) In the verification theorem for N -player games, we obtain the correct form of the HJB equations for general stochastic games with singular controls. Unlike all previous analysis that focused on two-player games, we show that in addition to the standard HJBs that correspond to stochastic control problems, there is an essential term that is unique to stochastic games. This term represents the interaction among players, especially the ones who are active and those who are waiting. This critical term was missing in two-player stochastic games and was simply (mis)understood as a regularity condition (Remark 3.3).
(ii) This structural difference between games and control problems is further revealed in the explicit solution of the NEs for N -player games. Instead of the usual free boundary for control problems, the free boundary for games is "moving". In a Markovian control problem, a free boundary depends on the state of the system; in stochastic games, however, the "face" of the boundary moves based on the action of herself and other players ( Figure 4 ). (iii) This difference is further highlighted in the framework of controlled rank-dependent SDEs.
To the best of our knowledges, this is the first time a stochastic game is explicitly connected with rank-dependent SDEs in a more general form. This new form of rank-dependent SDEs presents a fresh class of yet-to-be studied SDEs (Section 7.2).
(iv) Finally, stochastic games considered in this paper are resource allocation games. Resource allocation problems have a wide range of applications including cloud computing, smart power grid control, and multimedia wireless networks [47, 26, 54, 64, 25] . However, the existing literature has been unsuccessful in analyzing the resource allocation problem in the setting of stochastic games. Besides the technical contributions, our analysis provides a useful economic insight: in a stochastic game of resource allocations, sharing has lower cost than dividing and pooling yields the lowest cost for each player.
Related work. There are several papers on non-zero-sum games with singular controls [49, 38, 28, 31, 42, 20, 27] . All of these works are games without the fuel constraint and thus are built on one-dimension stochastic control problems. Furthermore, except for [27] , all of these papers are restricted to the case of N = 2. Most importantly, because of the restricted problem setting, none of these works managed to discover the critical structural difference between stochastic games and controls. We believe our work is the first to complete the mathematical analysis on an N -player stochastic game based on an original two-dimensional control problem. There has been some work on reflected SDEs in time-dependent domains. Reflected Brownian motion in smooth time-dependent domains with normal reflection was considered by [9, 10] via the heat equation. The one-dimensional case was also studied by [11] through the Skorokhod problem. Later, [51, 48] gave the construction of reflected SDEs in non-smooth time-dependent domains with oblique reflection. There is some work, i.e. [59, 12, 62] , on Brownian motion reflected on another Brownian motion, motivated from the study of the Brownian web. However, none of these works involves controls.
In our work the controlled dynamics and the moving free boundary are recast in the framework of controlled rank-dependent SDEs. The rank-dependent SDEs without controls arise in the "Up the River" problem [1] and in stochastic portfolio theory [24] , including the wellstudied Atlas model for the ergodicity and sample path properties [3, 34, 35, 33, 52, 55, 56] and for the hydrodynamic limit and fluctuations of the Atlas model [21, 60, 13] . Compared to the well-known rank-dependent SDEs, rank-dependent SDEs with an additional control component has not been studied before. We establish the existence of the solution by directly constructing a reflected diffusion process. (See Section 7.2 for further discussions.)
Notations and organization. Throughout the paper, we denote vectors/matrices by bold case letters, e.g., x x x and X X X. The tranpose of a real vector x x x is denoted as x x x T . For a vector x x x, x x x denotes its l 2 norm. For a matrix X X X, X X X denotes its spectral norm. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mathematical formulation of the N -player game. Section 3 provides verification theorem for sufficient conditions of the NE of the game. Section 4 studies game C p C p C p and Section 5 studies game C d C d C d . With the insight from these two games, Section 6 analyzes the general N -player game C C C. Section 7 compares games
and C C C, discusses the game values and their economic implications, and unifies their corresponding controlled dynamics in the framework of the controlled rank-dependent SDEs.
Problem Setup
Now we present the mathematical formulation for the stochastic N -player game.
Controlled dynamics. Let (X i t ) t≥0 be the position of player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In the absence of controls, X X X t = (X 1 t , . . . , X N t ) is governed by the stochastic differential equation (SDE): 
Chapter IV] for background on SDEs. If a control is applied to X i t , then X i t evolves as
where σ σ σ i is the i th row of the covariance matrix σ σ σ. Here the control (ξ i+ , ξ i− ) is a pair of non-decreasing and càdlàg processes, and of finite variation.
Game objective. The game is for player i to minimize, for all (ξ i+ , ξ i− ) in an appropriate admissible control set, over an infinite time horizon, the following objective function,
Here α is a constant discount factor. In this game, players interact through their respective objective functions h i (x x x) : R N → R + , which are assumed to be twice differentiable, with
) is a distance function between the position of player i and the center of all players.
Admissible control policies. The admissible control set S N (y y y) for this N -player game is given by
5)
where
with a ij = 0 or 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ M , M j=1 a ij > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N , and N i=1 a ij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , M .
Here is the intuition for S N (y y y). In this game, each player i will make a decision based on the current positions of all players and the available resources. In addition to this adaptedness constraint, the admissible control set S N (y y y) specifies the resource allocation policy for each player. For M different types of resources, define A A A := (a ij ) i,j ∈ R N ×M to be the adjacent matrix with a ij = 0 or 1. Then A A A describes the relationship between the players and the types of available resources, with a ij = 1 meaning that resource of type j is available to player i, and a ij = 0 meaning that resource of type j is inaccessible to player i. The condition M j=1 a ij > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N implies that each player i has access to at least one resource, and the condition N i=1 a ij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , M indicates that each resource j is available to at least one player. Moreover, when there are multiple types of resources available, player i consumes available resources randomly, resulting in the form of the integrand in the expression of Y t . See Figure 1 for illustration. ( Figure 1a ). The resource allocation policy is illustrated in Figure 1b , with the amount of available resource y 1 and y 2 of types one and two respectively. When player one wishes to apply controls of amount ∆, say ∆ ≤ y 1 + y 2 , she will consume resources randomly from type one and two. So player one will take ∆ y 1 y 1 +y 2 from resource one and ∆ y 2 y 1 +y 2 from resource two. Finally, the condition P(dξ i t dξ k t = 0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 and i = k excludes the possibility of simultaneous jumps of N players, which facilitates designing feasible control policies when controls involve jumps.
Games formulation. Let ξ ξ ξ := (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N ) be the controls from the players. Let x x x := (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and y y y := (y 1 , . . . , y M ). Then the stochastic game is for each player i to minimize
subject to the dynamics in (2.3) and (2.6) with the constraint in (2.5). There are two special games of particular interest. One is a game where all players pool their resources such that
is the accumulative amount of controls/resources consumed by player i up to time t. When N = 1, this is a single player game corresponding to the finite fuel control problem which is well studied in [5, 39] . We call this game a pooling game C p C p C p . Clearly in terms of the adjacent matrix A A A, this corresponds to M = 1, and
where y i is the total amount of controls that player i can exercise. This game is called
Finally, we refer the game with a general A A A as game C C C.
Game Solution under NE and Verification Theorem
We will analyze the N -player game under the criterion of Markovian NE. See [15] for various concepts of NE of differential games. Recall the definition of a Markovian NE of N -player games.
Here the strategies ξ i * and ξ i are deterministic function of time t, X X X t = (
Controls that give Markovian NEs are called the Markovian Nash Equilibrium Points (MNEPs). The associated value function is called the game value.
We first derive heuristically the associated HJB equations for the game (2.7). To this end, we start with some notations of region partitions for each player. 
x, y y y) = 0}, and its waiting region is
Now the HJB is derived as follows. When A j ∩A i = ∅ for all i = j and (x x x, y y y) ∈ W −i , ∆ξ j * = 0 for j = i. Thus the game for player i becomes a classical control problem with three cases: ∆ξ i * = 0, ∆ξ i * ,+ > 0, and ∆ξ i * ,− < 0. The case ∆ξ i * = 0 implies, by simple stochastic calculus,
(3.1) When (x x x, y y y) ∈ A j , player j will control. Denote the amount of control by player j as
This leads to
Remark 3.3. Note that when N = 2, the above equation corresponds to the continuity condition of game values. For general N -player games, it is a mathematical description of interactions between the player in control and those who are not. It guarantees that all players control optimally so that they sequentially push the underlying dynamics until reaching the common waiting region. This is consistent with the intuition that NE is conditionally optimal for each player.
Next we present a verification theorem which gives sufficient conditions of an MNEP.
Theorem 3.4 (Verification theorem). Assume A j ∩A i = ∅ for all i = j. For each i = 1, . . . , N , suppose that the i th player's strategy ξ i * ∈ U i N satisfies the following conditions
Proof of Theorem 3.4. It suffices to prove that for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
Note that condition (v) implies that T 0 e −αt N j=1 u i x j dB j t is a uniformly integrable martingale. Now by conditions (ii), (iv), (v) and the convexity of u i , we get
By letting T → ∞, the inequality (3.4) and condition (iii) lead to the desirable inequality. Along with condition (vii), the equality holds with value v i (x x x, y y y).
Our next task is to solve explicitly the game C C C, based on sufficient conditions in the above verification theorem. We will first analyze games C p C p C p and C d C d C d to gain insight into the solution structure. For ease of exposition, we assume for i = 1, . . . , N ,
where h is convex, symmetric and h(0) ≥ 0.
Nash Equilibrium for Game
This section analyzes the Markovian NE of game C p C p C p . Section 4.1 derives the solution to the HJB equations. Section 4.2 constructs the controlled process from the HJB solution. Section 4.3 derives the NE for the game C p C p C p and specifies the NE for the two-player game with h(
Solving HJB equations. Define
to be the distance from x i to the center of (
such that the action region A i and the waiting region W i of the i th player are defined by
4) and
Note here the partition {Q i } 1≤i≤N is introduced to avoid simultaneous jumps by multiple players so that A i ∩ A j = ∅. The key idea of designing the partition is that if several players are in E + i ∪ E − i , the player who is the farthest away from the center controls. If ties occur, the player with the largest index controls. It is easy to see that W i = ∅ for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and
As a consequence, 7) and
.
Specializing to the case h(x) = x 2 , we get
where c is the unique positive root of z tanh z = 1, and
(4.12) 4.2. Controlled dynamics. Given the candidate solution to (HJB-C p ), we construct the corresponding NEP by defining the dynamics of the controlled process (X X X t , Y t ; t ≥ 0). This is a diffusion with degeneracy in Y , and living in an unbounded polyhedron for a fixed Y . To start, for y ≥ 0, let
with the i th component to be 1, and n n n i+N = −n n n i . Note that for N ≥ 3, the section W N E (y) is an unbounded polyhedron with 2N boundary faces and n n n j is the unit normal vector of F j (y) (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N ). For N = 2, the section W N E (y) is a strip delimited by two straight lines
Define the reflection vector on each boundary F i (y) by r r r i = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), with the i th component being 1, and r r r i+N = −r r r i for i = 1, . . . , N . Note that r r r j · n n n j = N − 1 N for j = 1, . . . , 2N, (4.14)
so the reflection vectors (r r r j ) 1≤j≤2N satisfy the skew symmetry condition [63] in the polyhedron W N E (y). The result of Williams [63] , together with a localization argument, shows that there exists a reflected Brownian motion in the polyhedron W N E (y) which is defined as a solution to a submartingale problem. More precisely, the reflected process
where (η j y (t); t ≥ 0) is the local time process on the boundary F j (y) such that η j y is continuous and non-decreasing with η j y (0−) = 0, and η j y increases only at times t such that R j y (t) ∈ F j (y). Moreover, if x x x / ∈ F i (y) ∩ F j (y) for any i = j, we have
Now we construct the controlled process (X X X t , Y t ; t ≥ 0) corresponding to the solution to (HJB-C p ) described in Section 4.1. There are two cases depending on whether X X X 0− ∈ W N E (y) or not.
Case 1: X X X 0− = x x x ∈ W N E (y). Let τ 1 := inf{t > 0 : R R R y (t) ∈ ∂W N E (y)} be the first time when the reflected process R R R y , starting at x x x and driven by B 1 = (B 1 1 , . . . , B N 1 ), hits the boundary ∂W N E (y). Then we have
At time τ 1 , the local time η η η y pushes the process X X X back into W N E (y). So
where R R R Yτ k−1 is a copy of the reflected process in W N E (Y τ k−1 ), starting at X X X τ k−1 and driven by B k = (B 1 k , . . . , B N k ). Then we have for τ k−1 ≤ t ≤ τ k ,
So X X X is constructed by pasting copies of reflected Brownian motion in an evolving domain according to the amount of remaining resource Y . Let τ Y := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y t = 0} be the time at which the resource is used up. The controlled process (X X X, Y ) can be expressed as
and
(4.19) with convention τ 0 := 0. If x x x ∈ F i (y) ∩ F j (y) for some i = j, then a small perturbation in the NE game value reduces the case to x x x ∈ W N E (y). Thus P(dξ i t dξ j t = 0 for any i = j, t ≥ 0) = 1.
We show that the controlled process X X X jumps sequentially to a point x x x ∈ W N E ( y) for some 0 ≤ y < y, and then follows the dynamics (4.18)-(4.19) starting at x x x ∈ W N E ( y). In this case, the jumps will either stop in finite steps, or converge to a limit point x x x ∈ ∂W N E ( y) for 0 ≤ y < y.
For each k ≥ 1, let x x x k = (x 1 k , . . . , x N k ) be the positions, and y k be the remaining resource after the k th jump. If (x x x k , y k ) ∈ A i , then the i th player will jump until X X X hits ∂E + i ∪ ∂E − i . Suppose that the jumps do not stop in finite steps. At the k th step, let x 
Thus the i th * player should jump at least max 1≤i≤N
∧ y in the (k + 1) th step. It suffices to take ε sufficiently small to get a contradiction.
In summary, the controlled process inherits a rich structure from the candidate solution.
• If starting at a point in the common waiting region of all N players, then the controlled process is a reflected Brownian motion with an evolving free boundary. • If staring at a point outside the common waiting region, then the controlled process follows rank-dependent dynamics with a moving origin.
4.3.
NE for the N -player game. Combining the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and based on the verification theorem developed in Section 3, we have the following theorem of the NE for the N -player game (2.7) with constraint (4.1).
where • A i and W i are given in (4.3) , and E ± i is given in (4.4) with f N (·) defined by (4.7)-(4.9), • x i is defined by (4.2), and A N (·) is defined by (4.8),
Then v i is the game value associated with an MNEP ξ ξ ξ * = (ξ 1 * , . . . , ξ N * ). That is, Moreover, the controlled process (X X X * , Y * ) under ξ ξ ξ * is given in Section 4.2.
Proof. It suffices to apply Theorem 3.4 with the construction of
which is easily shown to be C 2 (R N × R + ) and convex.
To illustrate, we specialize give an MNEP for the two-player game (2.7) with (4.1) and h(x) = x 2 , where (f sq 2 ) −1 is defined in (4.11). Moreover, let v 1 and v 2 be the associated values of the above MNEP (ξ 1 * , ξ 2 * ), then
24)
and x 2 + is the unique root of z −f sq 2 (z) = x 1 −y, and x 2 − is the unique root of z +f sq 2 (z) = x 1 +y.
Note that under partition {Q i } i=1,2 , we have A 1 = ∅, hence (ξ 1 * ,+ , ξ 1 * ,− ) = (0, 0). 
Nash Equilibrium For Game
In this section, we study the MNEP of the N -player game
Recall that the major difference between game C p C p C p and game C d C d C d is that, in the former all N players share a fixed amount of the same resource, while in the latter each player has her own individual fixed resource constraint. This difference is reflected in (HJB −C p ) and (HJB −C d ) in terms of their dimensionality, and in each player's control based on the remaining resources. In particular, (HJB − C p ) and the state space (x x x, y) of C p C p C p are of dimension N + 1, whereas (HJB − C d ) and the state space (x x x, y y y) of
, each player controls her own resource level, the gradient constraint becomes −v i y i ± v i x i for player i. So if A i ∩ A j = ∅, the HJB equation for v i (x x x, y y y) in game C C C d is as follows.
Note that the control policy of the i th player only depends on (x x x, y i ) in W −i . As seen in Section 4, for the controlled process of type C p C p C p , upon hitting the boundary of the polyhedron, the polyhedron will expand in all directions. While for the controlled process of type C d C d C d , only one direction of the the polyhedron will move once hit.
To proceed, similar to Section 4, define the action region A i ∈ R N × R N + and the waiting region W i of the i th player by 
is a solution to (HJB-C d ), where p N (·) is defined by (4.6), and A N (·) defined by (4.8). The next step is to construct the controlled process (X X X, Y Y Y ) corresponding to the HJB solution (5.4) . For y y y ∈ R N + , let
which is a polyhedron with 2N boundary faces Case 1: X X X 0− = x x x ∈ W N E (y y y). Let τ 0 := 0. Define by induction that for k ≥ 1,
, starting at X X X τ k−1 and driven by B k = (B 1 k , . . . , B N k ). We have for τ k−1 ≤ t ≤ τ k ,
So X X X is constructed by pasting copies of reflected Brownian motion in an evolving polyhedron according to which boundary face is hit.
. Then at time τ k , only the i th k and (i k + N ) th boundaries will be changed. Note that this is in contrast to the N -player game C p C p C p , where all 2N boundaries will be enlarged no matter which boundary face is hit. Let τ Y i := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y i t = 0} be the time at which the i th player runs out of resources. The controlled process (X X X, Y Y Y ) can be expressed as
. , x N k ) be the positions, and y y y k = (y 1 k , . . . , y N k ) be the resource remaining after the k th control. If (x x x k , y y y k ) ∈ A i , then the i th player will control until X X X hits ∂E + i ∪ ∂E − i . The argument in Section 4.2 shows that the controlled process X X X controls sequentially to a point x x x ∈ W N E ( y y y) for 0 0 0 ≤ y y y ≤ y y y. Then (X X X, Y Y Y ) follows the dynamics (5.7)-(5.8) starting at ( x x x, y y y).
In summary, the NE for the N -player game (2.7) with constraint C d C d C d is stated as follows.
where • A i and W i are given in (5.2) , and E ± i is given in (5.3) with f N (·) defined by (4.7)-(4.9), • x i is defined by (4.2), and A N (·) is defined by (4.8),
Then v i is the game value associated with an MNEP ξ ξ ξ * = (ξ 1 * , . . . , ξ N * ). That is, v i (x x x, y y y) = J i C d (x x x, y y y; ξ ξ ξ * ). Moreover, the controlled process (X X X * , Y Y Y * ) under ξ ξ ξ * is given in this section: Case 1 if X X X * 0− ∈ W N E (y y y), and Case 2 if X X X * 0− / ∈ W N E (y y y), where W N E (y y y) is defined as in (5.5).
Specializing to the two-player game with h(x) = x 2 , we have the following result.
The following controls
give an MNEP for the two-player game
• F 2 (y) = F 3 (y) = (x 1 , x 2 ) :
• η i * t are non-decreasing processes with η i * 0− = 0 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4),
is given by (4.11). (i, j = 1, 2 and i = j). Moreover, let v 1 and v 2 be the corresponding values of the above MNEP (ξ 1 * , ξ 2 * ). Then if y 1 > y 2 ,
(5.12) where A(·) is given by (4.24) .
Comparison of Corollary 4.2 and Corollary 5.2. Consider N = 2 and h(x) = x 2 . In game C p C p C p , only player two controls the two separating hyperplanes whereas player one does nothing, see Figure 2 . In game C p C p C p , player one controls the two separating hyperplanes when y 1 > y 2 and she does nothing when y 2 ≥ y 1 . See Figure 3 . 6. Nash Equilibrium for game C C C
In the previous two sections, we have dealt with two special games C p C p C p and C d C d C d . Analysis of these two games provides important insight into the solution structure of the general game C C C. Namely, the NE strategy depends on the positions of players and their remaining resource levels. With these two special cases in mind, now recall that in game C C C,
For the HJB equation (HJB − C), the gradient constraint is more complicated than the two special cases
for (x x x, y y y) ∈ W −i ,
for (x x x, y y y) ∈ A j , j = i.
In particular, if A A A = [1, 1, · · · , 1] T ∈ R N ×1 , then (HJB − C) becomes (HJB − C p ); and if A A A = I N I N I N , then it is (HJB − C d ).
Similar to Section 4, define the action region A i ∈ R N × R M + and the waiting region W i of the i th player by
3) From the analysis in Sections 4 and 5, and the "guess" that the control policy of player i only depends
is a solution to (HJB-C), where p N (·) is defined by (4.6), and A N (·) defined by (4.8). The next step is to construct the controlled process (X X X, Y Y Y ) corresponding to the HJB solution (6.4). 
, starting at X X X τ k−1 and driven by
So X X X is again constructed by pasting copies of reflected Brownian motion in an evolving polyhedron according to which boundary face is hit.
. For any two players i = j, if a a a i · a a a j = 0, we say player i and player j are connected since they share at least one resource type. Similarly, we say player i and player j are disconnected if a a a i ·a a a j = 0. Then at time τ k , not only the i th k and (i k + N ) th boundaries will be changed, but also the faces from the players who are connected to player i k . This is because at least one type of resource will decrease after player i k 's controls. This is in contrast to the N -player game under constraint C p C p C p , where all 2N boundaries will be enlarged no matter which boundary face is hit. This differs also from game C d C d C d in terms of the exact boundary faces involved.
Let τ X i := inf{t ≥ 0 : a ij Y j t = 0} be the time at which player i runs out of resource. The controlled process (X X X, Y Y Y ) can be expressed as (i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j = 1, 2, · · · , M ),
and . . , y M k ) be the remaining resource level after the k th jump. If (x x x k , y y y k ) ∈ A i , then the i th player will jump until X X X hits ∂E + i ∪ ∂E − i . The argument in Section 4.2 shows that the controlled process X X X jumps sequentially to a point x x x ∈ W N E ( y y y) for 0 0 0 ≤ y y y ≤ y y y. Then (X X X, Y Y Y ) follows the dynamics (6.7)-(6.8) starting at ( x x x, y y y).
The NE for the N -player game (2.7) with constraint C C C is stated as follows.
Theorem 6.1 (NE for the N -player game C C C). Let v i :
where • A i and W i are given in (6.2) , and E ± i is given in (6.3) with f N (·) defined by (4.7)-(4.9), • x i is defined by (4.2), and A N (·) defined by (4.8),
Then v i is the value associated with a MNEP ξ ξ ξ * = (ξ 1 * , . . . , ξ N * ). That is, v i (x x x, y y y) = J i C (x x x, y y y; ξ ξ ξ * ). Moreover, the controlled process (X X X * , Y Y Y * ) under ξ ξ ξ * is given by (6.7)-(6.8) as Case 1 if X X X * 0− ∈ W N E (y y y), and described as Case 2 if X X X * 0− / ∈ W N E (y y y), where W N E (y y y) is defined as in (6.5).
7.
Comparing Games C p , C d and C
In this section, we compare the games C p C p C p , C d C d C d and C C C. We will first compare their game values and discuss their economic implications. We will then discuss their difference in terms of the NEP. Finally, we discuss their perspective NEs in the framework of controlled rank-dependent SDEs.
To make the games comparable, let us assume y = N j=1 y j . Let us also consider a special sharing game C s C s C s which can be connected with both C d C d C d and C p C p C p : The first inequality holds because y = N i=1 y i ≥ N i=1 a ij y j and the equality holds if and only if a ij = 1 for each j = 1, 2, · · · , N . The second inequality holds because a ii = 1 and the equality holds if and only if a ij = 0 for each j = i. This result has a clear economic interpretation. In a stochastic game where players have the options to share resources, versus the possibility to divide resources in advance, sharing will have lower cost than dividing. Pooling yields the lowest cost for each player. Figure 4 . Comparison of evolving free boundaries for C p C p C p , C d C d C d , C C C when N = 3. Figure 4a shows a pooling game C p C p C p . After one player exercises controls, all the faces of the boundary move. Figure 4b corresponds to a dividing game C d C d C d . After player i exercises controls, her faces of F i and F i+N move. Here i = 1, N = 3. For a sharing game C C C, shown in Figure 4c , after one player exercises her controls, the faces of the players who are connected with her will move, while the faces for other players remain unchanged. Here i = 2 and player 2 and 3 are connected.
7.2.
NEs for the games and controlled rank-dependent SDEs. In the previous sections, the controlled dynamics is constructed directly via the reflected Brownian motion. This class of SDEs can also be cast in the framework of rank-dependent SDEs. Indeed, the controlled dynamics of NE in the action regions of the N -player can be written as a controlled rank-dependent SDEs:
with (ξ i,+ , ξ i,− ) the controls, F i : R N × R M + → R a rank function depending on both X X X and Y Y Y , F (1) ≤ . . . ≤ F (N ) the order statistics of (F i ) 1≤i≤N , and δ i ∈ R, σ i ≥ 0. In game C p C p C p , the controlled dynamics in the action regions satisfies the SDEs with F i Cp (x x x, y y y) = |x i − j =i xj N −1 |, δ i = 0 and σ i = 0 for each i = 1, . . . N , and
For the general game C C C, the controlled process in the action regions is governed by the rank-dependent dynamics with F i C (x x x, y y y) = |x i − j =i xj N −1 − f −1 N ( M j=1 a ij y j )| where f N is a threshold function defined in (4.7)-(4.9), and δ i , σ i and ξ i,± satisfy the same condition as before.
Note that the special case without controls, i.e., F i (x x x, y y y) = x i and ξ i,± = 0, corresponds to the rank-dependent SDEs. In particular, the rank-dependent SDEs with δ 1 = 1, δ 2 = . . . δ N = 0 is known as the Atlas model. To the best of our knowledge, rank-dependent SDEs with additional controls or a general rank function F i has not been studied before. There are various aspects including uniqueness and sample path properties that await further investigation and we leave them to interested readers.
